How Supreme a Court? by Kadri, Thomas E.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law 
Popular Media Faculty Scholarship 
11-19-2018 
How Supreme a Court? 
Thomas E. Kadri 
University of Georgia School of Law, tek@uga.edu 
Repository Citation 
Kadri, Thomas E., "How Supreme a Court?" (2018). Popular Media. 315. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_pm/315 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Popular Media by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ 
Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please contact 
tstriepe@uga.edu. 
How Supreme a Court?  
Thomas Kadri 
Slate’s Future Tense – November 19, 2018 
 
 
Facebook is planning an independent appeals process for content moderation 
decisions. But how much power will it have? 
 
 
After a scandal-filled year, Facebook has faced pressure from lawmakers on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The U.S. Congress grilled CEO Mark Zuckerberg about his 
company’s role in enabling election interference, while British lawmakers were 
snubbed after asking Zuckerberg to answer questions about Facebook’s role in 
influencing the country’s Brexit vote. 
In the midst of all this hullabaloo, Zuckerberg raised a fascinating idea that might 
prove to be a quasi-constitutional moment for his company: What if he delegated 
some of his immense power to an independent “Supreme Court” that could decide 
what speech was “acceptable” in the Facebook community? Many assumed that 
this idea was bluster—a sleight of hand to distract legislators eager to restrain 
Facebook’s vast power. But on Thursday, Zuckerberg officially announced plans 
to create an “independent body” to resolve appeals from Facebook users whose 
speech has been taken down. Zuckerberg was bullish about how this tribunal 
would provide “accountability” and “prevent the concentration of too much 
decision-making” within Facebook’s own ranks. 
This is good news: It’s high time that our most influential “new governor” offered 
the public greater transparency and accountability in its role as one of the key 
“custodians of the public sphere.” But just how transparent and accountable 
Facebook will now become depends largely on what “constitutional” structure it 
creates around its new board of overseers. As Zuckerberg makes these structural 
choices, he could learn a lot from the American and British politicians who’ve 
hounded him throughout the year. 
 
In the American constitutional system, three equal branches of government—the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary—each play important roles in 
restraining one another’s ambitions. Most relevant to Facebook’s plans, the 
Supreme Court often hears appeals to determine whether the other branches have 
correctly interpreted the law or violated the Constitution. This practice of “judicial 
review” has bite because, in the United States, the Supreme Court has the final say 
about the meaning of federal law: Congress and the executive branch can make 
legal arguments to the justices, but, as the Supreme Court famously declared 
in Marbury v. Madison back in 1803, “it is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.” In short, in the American 
constitutional system, the Supreme Court’s word is supreme. 
Contrast that with the system in the United Kingdom: parliamentary sovereignty. 
The Brits have neither a written constitution nor any court empowered to overturn 
primary legislation passed by politicians. Instead, the British system of 
parliamentary sovereignty means that the courts can’t invalidate laws because 
Parliament is the supreme legal authority. As noted English jurist A.V. Dicey once 
explained, Parliament has “the right to make or unmake any law whatever,” and 
“no person or body” may “override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.” In 
short, in the British constitutional system, Parliament’s word is supreme. 
What does all of this have to do with Facebook’s “Supreme Court”? Facebook, it 
seems, will retain the legislative and executive powers to write and implement its 
speech rules, and it will even continue to exercise some judicial powers by 
resolving most moderation decisions in the first instance. But left unanswered is 
exactly how the new appeals court will alter the balance of power within the 
company. The American and British models show us two vastly different 
approaches that Facebook could take—but because Zuckerberg has told us very 
little about how the tribunal will function, we can only speculate. 
On the one hand, Facebook could adopt American-style judicial review, where the 
appellate body would review decisions made by Facebook’s moderators and have 
the final say on the meaning of Facebook’s “laws”—the rules that spell out what 
speech is allowed on the platform. So, for example, if Facebook’s policy against 
hate speech prohibits attacks on people based on a “serious disease or disability,” 
the tribunal might interpret that provision to bar speech that disparages people for 
having a drug addiction. That ruling would be final and binding on Facebook going 
forward, even if it didn’t like it. 
But Facebook could take another path—something more like the British model. It 
might allow the tribunal to make case-by-case determinations about particular 
content, and those determinations might even be “binding,” as Zuckerberg said 
they would be. A misunderstood satirical post that was taken down might go back 
up; an underappreciated threat that was kept up might disappear. But what will 
these one-off decisions do to Facebook’s overall rule set? Will its hands really be 
tied? Or, to return to the earlier hypothetical, if Facebook decides that it wants 
people to be free to disparage people with drug addictions, could it simply nullify 
the tribunal’s interpretation and pass a new rule saying that addiction isn’t a 
“serious disease or disability”? 
 
If Facebook is free to unilaterally overrule appellate decisions it doesn’t like, the 
talk of a new era of radical transparency and accountability will be overblown. Yet 
it’s true that Facebook has good reason to want some flexibility to alter its speech 
policies, as it constantly learns and adapts to tackle the Sisyphean task of satisfying 
a “community” of more than 2 billion people. Binding itself to a 2018 version of 
its rules will surely be untenable, but amending its legal code willy-nilly would 
undermine the entire project. 
One compromise would be for Facebook to adopt something like a constitution: a 
code of fundamental principles that would be harder to amend than the company’s 
malleable content moderation rules. Such a charter would also empower the 
tribunal, whose members would then have the crucial task of judging whether 
novel speech rules adhered to Facebook’s fundamental principles. This move 
would give the independent body real influence, but it would also mark a real 
concession of power that Zuckerberg might not be willing to make. 
Perhaps foreshadowing this tension, Zuckerberg’s announcement posed a vexing 
question about the members of the tribunal: “How do we ensure their 
independence from Facebook, but also their commitment to the principles they 
must uphold?” For all of his talk about ceding power to outsiders, it seems that 
Zuckerberg isn’t ready to give up his role in defining “the principles” that 
Facebook “must uphold.” This makes a very American company just a little more 
British than you might realize. 
 
 
